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Abstract 
Cost-benefit analysis has become a widely used and well developed tool for 
evaluation of suggested transport projects. This paper presents our view of the 
role and position of CBA in a transport planning process, partly based on a brief 
survey of a number of countries where CBA plays a formalised role in decision 
making. The survey shows that methodologies, valuations and areas of 
application are broadly similar across countries. All countries place the CBA 
results in a comprehensive assessment framework that also includes various 
types of non-monetised benefits. An important advantage with using CBA is that 
it is a way to overcome cognitive, structural and process-related limitations and 
biases in decision making. Some of the main challenges to CBA and to 
quantitative assessment in general lie in the institutional and political context. 
There is often a risk that CBA enters the planning process too late to play any 
meaningful role. This risk seems to increase when planning processes are ǲǳ. If the problem is perceived as important 
enough, even inefficient solutions may be viewed as better than nothing, despite ǲǳǤ 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Democratic societies face considerable difficulties in deciding what to do about 
transport.  On one side of a triangle there is a firm belief, with some evidence, that 
transport investment is an important driver of economic performance and competitive 
advantage in an open globalised marketplace. On a second side are those who say that 
our lifestyles are unsustainable and that meeting demand growth or creating new 
demand for travel is fundamentally misguided. Completing the triangle is a sceptical 
public who would like better transport infrastructure, but not at any cost, and certainly 
not in their own back yard. Whereas fifty years ago, transport decision making was in 
the hands of a professional elite, overseen by elected politicians, today we have moved 
closer to decision by democratic consent, with all the pros and cons of the Athenian 
form of governance which that entails. 
 
Many excellent texts have been written about economic appraisal methods (for 
example Boardman et al (2011)), but given this culture change, the purpose of this 
paper is to address some particular questions about transport appraisal. Where does 
appraisal sit in the overall decision-making process? What is the state of the art of 
transport cost-benefit analysis in particular? What are the key challenges facing 
practitioners? Is the transport appraisal framework which is widely taught in 
universities around the world still a useful paradigm, or is it buckling under the strain 
of divergent social forces and visions? 
 
We first summarise why and how CBA is used, and give our view of its main benefits 
(section 2). We then compare methodologies and uses across seven countries where 
CBA is broadly used, noting many similarities but also some differences (section 3). 
CBA is faced with both technical and institutional challenges, and we summarise what 
we believe are the most important ones (section 4).    
2 THE ROLE OF CBA  
2.1 The Role of Transport Appraisal 
The creation, assessment and approval of a transport project is a dynamic process with 
multiple feedbacks within a forcefield of influences which can be roughly grouped into 
the fields of vision, pressures and analysis (Figure 1). Stripping the process right down, 
somebody somewhere has an idea. That idea then enters an arena of pressure testing, 
at first at the outline level and then at successively more detailed levels. The idea might 
be seen as consistent with policy or political aspiration, it might gel with popular 
opinion, it might be seen as addressing particular problems. But then come the tough 
questions: what will it cost, who will pay, can it be delivered and above all, is it 
worthwhile? 
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Figure 1. Decisions and judgements are affected by visions, pressures and analyses.  
Once it is accepted that these decisions need to be addressed as part of the process, we 
enter the analysis territory of Figure 1, and specifically the transport modelling and 
appraisal regime. The results feed back into the melting pot of decision making referred 
to in Figure 1 as Judgement. 
 
There is such a thing as human frailty. Judgement can be susceptible to such factors as 
whose idea it was in the first place (not invented here), where it is, who wants it, who 
will benefit and pay, and how much political capital will need to be spent to see it 
through. Such considerations inevitably enter into the judgement calculation. However 
this very frailty, or perhaps realpolitik, makes an argument for a strong appraisal 
framework with rules, established independently of individual cases and capable of 
being applied repeatedly over time so as to build up a library of cases enabling 
comparability of judgement.  For the majority of more or less typical schemes this is an 
advantage of a strong appraisal process. 
 ǯemselves without any 
formal appraisal guidance? One reason is that human cognitive ability is limited Ȃ more 
limited than we like to think. This is exacerbated by our innate tendencies to identify 
with projects which are being promoted, and to be over-optimistic and over-confident 
in general and in our cognitive ability in particular (Kahneman, 2011). Even a 
benevolent despot who truly wishes to strive for the greatest common good of the 
people and make the best use of public money is liable to fail because of a number of 
psychological reasons that apply to humans in general: 
 
- We are not good at considering many variables and aspects simultaneously; 
instead we tend to focus on one or very few aspects and are often unaware that 
we do this. 
- We usually reach decisions very rapidly based on gut instinct or subconscious 
analogy. Then we tend to look for evidence and arguments which support the 
decision. 
- We are prone to wishful thinking, optimism bias and loss aversion, so we have 
difficulties in abandoning an idea or a decision once we have settled for it. 
- We tend to over-generalise, turning anecdotes or single cases into general rules. 
- We are not good at understanding or comparing different orders of magnitude. 
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- Moreover, we are not aware of these processes and if made aware of them can 
find them quite threatening. 
 
Decision makers may face hundreds of projects, either simultaneously or sequentially, 
and it is simply not possible to completely process all these options. In such situations, 
humans are bound to use simple heuristics, such as only focusing on one or a few 
aspects. Even worse, decision makers will most likely not be aware that they use a 
simplifying heuristics; they may honestly believe that they are taking all aspects into 
account. 
 
Appraisal is potentially an antidote to this. It makes it easier to structure information 
and remember and consider all or most aspects of a suggested project. It enables orders 
of magnitude to be created that are comparable both across projects and types of 
effects. A framework within which impacts are quantified on a consistent basis forces 
decision makers to face up to numbers, so decreasing optimism bias and our inherent 
reluctance to give up beliefs and ideas. 
 
Implicit in Figure 1 is a world in which there are many stakeholders Ȃ different levels of 
government, infrastructure providers, operators, transport users, representatives of 
environmental and planning interests. The case for a project is likely to look different 
from different perspectives. An analysis framework is a useful device for ensuring that 
relevant information is brought together in one place and in one way which is specified 
in advance in the rulebook. Activities such as Public Consultation and Public Inquiry are 
greatly facilitated by the existence of an appraisal framework. Moreover, it allows and 
supports decentralised decision making, including local public inquiries and local 
delegations of power. 
 
Another reason for using CBA stems from the fact that it is not always politically 
rational to strive for the greatest common good. Policies where a small group of 
beneficiaries gain significantly at the expense of a large group which loses only a little 
are often politically rational. The larger group will often not care enough about a small 
loss to let it affect how they vote, while the large gain for the small group may be 
pivotal for which politician they will support (Harford (2009) provides an entertaining 
illustration of sugar production subsidies). Transport investments often have precisely 
this feature: any single investment takes a little from a large group (e.g. all taxpayers) 
while hugely benefitting a small group (e.g. a specific subset of travellers). Since any 
single investment is politically rational in this way, over-investment is the expected 
outcome. CBA acts as an antidote to this, especially if it is used to compare many 
investments against each other with a fixed budgǤǡǲǯǳ (a quote from Lars Hultkrantz). 
 
While there is a well-established convention of using cost benefit analysis as a means of  
informing decision-makers about the impacts of transport schemes, the methods are 
also applied in other fields of public sector investment appraisal. For example, the UK 
Environment Agency makes use of CBA to determine the case for investment in flood 
protection and to prioritise between options. It is regularly used in the field of health 
economics, in the context of improvements to the quality of life enjoyed by patients and 
to options for environmental policy. 
 
To summarise, CBA in transport can be seen as a way of civilising the process of 
handling conflicts inherent in deciding the level of funding at programme level, how 
scarce funding should be allocated within the programme and whether particular 
projects should proceed. So the CBA framework and the values within it are important 
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not just in their own right but also because they confer legitimacy to contested 
decisions. 
2.2 The Form of the Appraisal Process. 
So far we have said nothing about particular appraisal techniques; the case for the 
analysis function has been put in generic terms. Now we ask Ȃ what form should the 
analysis take? This is not an easy question because a decision is in fact a package of 
decisions from the most strategic to the most detailed. Consider for example a proposal 
to improve transport quality in a dense urban corridor. It is convenient to think of three 
levels of questions 
 
1. What goals are we trying to achieve and how do the various options score against 
those goals? Is the preferred option socially desirable, affordable and 
deliverable? 
2. How do we enumerate and evaluate the size and distribution of the costs and 
benefits of the alternatives, and identify gainers and losers relative to the Do-
Minimum or Reference Case? 
3. Given the numerous choices of design, layout and technology, how do we 
optimise the cost-effectiveness of the scheme? 
 
This setup is shown in Figure 2. At the upper level there is one synthesis of 
performance against strategic goals for and constraints on delivering the desired 
improvement. At the middle level there is an analysis of several scheme options of 
which one will be the winner. At the lower level in the hierarchy there will be hundreds 
or thousands of detailed choices to be considered. Exhaustive global optimisation is 
impossible; it is necessary to segment the analysis process in some way. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The decision hierarchy.  
In some sectors, the middle level may be absent. For example, a national school 
building programme may contain a statement of objectives concerning meeting 
demand, class sizes, age of buildings, required facilities etc, and a design manual with 
specified classroom sizes, assembly room, labs and so on. Where the outputs are 
essentially homogeneous, this approach works. 
 
In the case of transport though, there are multiple objectives and outputs. While the 
numerous designs for a scheme with specific set of outputs are usually compared on a 
cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) or standards basis using a design manual, the final 
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option selection and the ranking between schemes is facilitated if multiple outputs can 
be brought to, or at least towards, a single metric. Various multi-criteria methods are 
available for weighing up the balance of inputs and outputs from a scheme but in 
practice the favoured approach is cost-benefit analysis. Progressively over the last fifty 
years, this approach has been codified in official guidance manuals, sometimes running 
to hundreds of pages, for example WebTAG in the UK.  
 
In its pure form, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is a framework within which all impacts of 
a scheme can be brought together and compared using the money metric. Some 
features of CBA are listed below: 
 
- It aims to be comprehensive in terms of the coverage of impacts 
- It considers all relevant parties affected, adopting a society wide approach, and 
thus differs from commercial appraisal 
- It seeks to obtain market or quasi market values for particular impacts and thus 
to base relative weights or values on willingness to pay. So relative to multi-
criteria analysis it adopts user/citizen/market weights rather than 
plannersǯȀǯ weights. 
- It is capable of being used to enumerate the distributional effects, who gains 
and who loses, at least with respect to first-order effects: how costs and benefits 
are dispersed in society as a whole in the long run is another issue, and it may 
be impossible to calculate this.  
- It deals explicitly with the passage of time through the discount rate which is 
important for long life infrastructure projects and which other methods 
frequently struggle with. 
- It is capable of delivering value for money metrics, and is a framework which 
permits treatment of risk and uncertainty and sensitivity testing.  
- It is capable of being used at a decentralised level by agencies and their 
consultants and can be the framework within which appraisal information is 
presented for public consultation or public inquiry.  
 
But there are various limitations of any technique of this kind and CBA is not magically 
exempt. First, there is a raft of technical issues. In particular, where do the values come 
from, how reliable are they and should they be private values or adjusted to social 
values?  There is also the issue of how to handle impacts for which there are no values 
such as loss of natural or heritage assets. This is one reason why CBA typically needs to 
be viewed as a framework of monetised and non-monetised impacts which, however, 
leads to difficulties with the value for money metric. Secondly, there are completeness 
issues. The cost-benefit analysis does not tell us whether a scheme is popular or bitterly 
controversial nor whether it is fundable. Above all, CBA does not map on to all the 
higher order strategic objectives of the government. 
 
The current UK Government has introduced the discipline of the Five Business Case 
Model within which projects are to be assessed in terms of their strategic, economic, 
commercial, financial and management (e.g. deliverability) cases. This is a form of 
Multi-Criteria Analysis but with no guidance on how to weight the performance in the 
different dimensions. The content of the CBA would be expected to drive the economic 
case and contribute to the strategic, commercial and financial cases. But the strategic 
case might go broader to address issues such as regional and social imbalances and 
macroeconomic performance. 
 
This suggests that CBA continues to be a very useful tool of the trade within the 
analytical territory of Figure 1. It is particularly useful within programmes, for example 
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for comparing schemes within a national highway programme where the scheme 
objectives and impacts tend to be broadly similar. When it comes to mega projects such 
as high speed rail, CBA can run into difficulties. This is partly because it is not easy to 
say what alternative form of expenditure the scheme is being compared withȄquite 
possibly not in the transport sector at all. It is partly because mega projects are 
expected to have transformational and macroeconomic effects which are hard to 
handle using microeconomic tools. But also such projects tend to become politicised 
early, making cool dispassionate assessment of such projects problematic. In truth it is 
difficult for government to be both promoter and appraiser of such projects at the same 
time in the glare of the modern media.   
 
Political visions have an unfortunate tendency to become too detailed too early. Early 
political commitment is the bane of cool judgement in decision making. Examples ǲa more balanced regional economyǳǲ    ǳ     ǲ-ǳǲǳǡ
or benefits of such schemes are remotely known. There is need for structured analyses 
of potential costs and benefits also at the most strategic level. One additional advantage 
of CBA is that it forces the options and their anticipated consequences to be clearly 
described. But decision-making on the strategic level is seldom developed or expressed 
in this way. Instead, it is phrased in terms of visions, targets and general directions. 
Weighing benefits against costs is still be a fruitful framework for analytic thought but 
the vision and analytical spheres depicted in Figure 1 can easily come into 
uncomfortable conflict. 
2.3 Does CBA actually influence decisions?   
Considering the limitations and constraints indicated above, one may wonder whether 
appraisal results actually influence decisions. A number of studies have investigated 
this question, many of them finding limited impact of appraisal results on investment 
decisions. There is a slight tendency, however, that the more recent studies to a larger 
extent find that objective costs and benefits actually matter for project selection.  
 
Fridstrøm & Elvik (1997) and Odeck (1996) show no or very marginal impact of costs 
and benefits on project ranking in Norway. Nilsson (1991) found similar results for 
Sweden. Nellthorp and Mackie (2000) examined what road schemes were kept in the 
national Roads Programme by the incoming 1997 UK Government. The monetised 
benefit/cost ratio had no significant impact on decisions, but several specific factors 
had, such as noise, landscape, heritage, safety, journey time, reliability, regeneration 
and cost, so appraisal results taken as a whole seemed to influence project selection. 
Decision makers placed high implicit values on noise, landscape, heritage, reliability 
and regeneration, none of which were monetised in the CBA at the time, while 
downweighting travel time relative to its CBA value. Odeck (2010) found similar results 
in Norway: although benefit-cost ratios did not seem to affect investment decisions by 
the Norwegian Government, some of the components in a CBA seemed to matter. 
Eliasson et al. (2014) found no correlation between costs, benefits or any other variable 
and the investment decisions of the Norwegian Government or Road Administration, 
whereas there was at least some 
ǯǡ
and a strong correlation for the decisions by the Swedish Transport Administration 
(confirming earlier results in Eliasson and Lundberg (2012)). Recent evidence from the 
UK indicate that appraisal results strongly affect project selection (UK Department for 
Transport, 2013). Schemes are categorised according to their BCR, adjusted to reflect  ǯ        Ǥ This 
categorisation strongly affects selection: schemes in the two highest categories 
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(adjusted BCR above 2) are generally approved, while a Ǯǯ
category (adjusted BCRs between 1.5 and 2.0) might be approved if funding is 
available. The Department tracks, as one of its  objectives, the proportion of 
expenditure spenǲhighǳ or ǲvery highǳ value for money schemes. For the past two 
years, almost 100% of spending was on schemes in the two highest categories. 
 
The studies above all deal with the final stage of the investment selection process Ȃ 
selecting a number of projects from a relatively short list of candidates. But this may be 
a too limited view: appraisal may also affect earlier stages in the planning process. Our 
view is that by its very existence appraisal acts as a filter to prevent many weak 
schemes proceeding very far through the project cycle Ȃ at least if appraisal actually 
affects the eventual decisions, and decision makers and civil servants are aware of it. 
This is perhaps similar to other filters such as unacceptable intrusions on heritage or 
natural assets. So the negative function of appraisal, to act as a cultural discipline to 
help weed out the weak cases, is important.  Eliasson et al. (2014) gives some evidence 
of this: in Norway, where there is no apparent correlation between appraisal results 
and project decisions, the candidate shortlist includes many more projects with very 
low BCRs than the corresponding list in Sweden, where there is a high correlation 
between appraisal and decisions. Tǲǳf the candidate lists, on the other 
hand, follow roughly the same BCR distribution. Eliasson and Lundberg (2012) 
interview Swedish civil servants, who confirm that since they know that appraisal will 
matter for the eventual decisions, they take this into account both when designing and 
shortlisting investments early in the process. 
3 THE CONTENT OF TRANSPORT COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Over the last two or three decades a position has been progressively built up where a 
number of countries are committed to using CBA as a framework and to conducting 
research and analysis to provide the value set within the framework. The results are 
then used in the Guidance Manuals which govern transport appraisal practice. A study  
done for the UK Government in 2013 summarises the position and compares CBA 
practice in seven countries: England, the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, the United 
States, Australia and New Zealand (Mackie and Worsley 2013). The countries were 
selected partly for their data availability and are by no means the only countries with 
serious appraisal guidance. Also NGOs such as the World Bank, European Investment 
Bank and EU offer appraisal guidance; HEATCO (2006) provided a comprehensive 
review of the then current appraisal practice. Several of the seven countries also have 
highly standardised modelling and forecasting methods, ensuring that the travel costs 
and traffic volume inputs to the appraisal are comparable across schemes; for example, 
Sweden has a national transport model which is compulsory to use whenever 
applicable. A summary of some key results of the study can be found in the Appendix 
and here are some reflections. 
3.1 General rules and parameters for Transport CBA 
In most if not all countries, the Treasury or Ministry of Finance provides overarching 
guidance to which transport sector appraisal guidance needs to conform.  The Green 
Book is the UK example (HM Treasury, 2013). Another is the recent Dutch General 
Guideline for Social Cost-Benefit Analysis (Romijn and Renes 2014). There is really no 
good reason for the discount rate to be chosen by the Transport Ministry and certainly 
not for it to be different from the rate used  in the other sectors of the economy which 
are subject to public appraisal. Similarly, the approaches to the appraisal unit of 
account, the use or not of shadow prices on for example public capital, and the 
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treatment of risk and uncertainty at least at the level of principle, should apply across 
sectors. 
Our reading of Table 1 of the Appendix is that there is a high level of conformity of 
practice at this general framework level. Sometimes there are differences. For example 
the European countries go for what looks like a social time preference discount rate 
around 3 per cent while the US and Australasia go for an Opportunity Cost rate around 
7-8%. Appraisal periods also differ, with countries using higher discount rates tending, 
unsurprisingly, to assume shorter project lives. Sweden uses a shadow price of public 
funds which raises the face value by 30%. The definition of the appraisal metrics, and 
particularly the benefit-cost ratio varies between countries. An interesting area is the 
treatment of transboundary effects and international traffic. While this is of little 
consequence for large countries, a significant practical issue is how to handle this in 
countries such as the Netherlands. Although the default nominal position is to count 
benefits and costs to the countryȄand this probably works well for sectors such as 
energy and waterȄfor some transport projects it is not convenient or practical to 
segment the traffic by nationality and ways around the general guidance are frequently 
sought. 
 
Overall though, the similarities far outweigh the differences. Countries use similar 
approaches for computing the present value of benefits and costs, they treat non-
monetised impacts through some sort of framework tabulation, they have appraisal 
guidance manuals which advise and regulate scheme developers, and as a result many 
countries Ministries of Transport have delegated powers to approve transport projects 
which pass the tests without further recourse to the Ministry of Finance. 
3.2 Benefit and Cost Values 
The benefit values used in appraisal in the seven countries in spring 2013 are 
summarised in Table 2 in the Appendix. Three general points emerge from the detail. 
 
Firstly, there is a good level of agreement within these seven countries about what can 
be valued in money terms, and a fair degree of similarity in the values used. Of course 
that might be explained by imitative behaviour, but there is a body of evidence, and 
there are outliers in the value set which would not be explained by copying.  
 
Secondly, the evidence base for monetary values has widened. Compared with a decade 
ago, there is guidance on valuing changes in reliability and in overcrowding on public 
transport, and values for recurrent environmental impacts such as noise, local 
pollutants and greenhouse gases. A move has been made towards more complete 
monetary valuation of the direct impacts though in some cases such as reliability there 
are significant modelling and prediction problems. However, environmental capital 
such as effects on landscape, natural and heritage assets remain generally as qualitative 
descriptions in the framework. 
 
Thirdly, the focus of the CBA itself has broadened out to try to encompass wider 
economy impacts. A number of countries seem to have come to a similar conclusion, 
that transport sector CBA was too narrow an approach and needed to be 
complemented in two ways. The first is to recognise the possibility of induced land-use 
change and the need for land-use transport interaction modelling for some types of 
project. Also, the additional wider economy impacts, notably agglomeration benefits 
from expanding capacity in cities are now incorporated in appraisal in several of these 
countries.  
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Taking these points together, the content of the monetised cost and benefit table has 
changed quite significantly. Arguably there has been more progress on this front in the 
last decade than in the previous four put together. No longer is there a rigid wall 
between time and safety benefits which can be measured in money and everything else 
which cannot. This is partly because transport investment is seen today much more as 
an agent of economic change than as an end in itself, and we return to this theme in 
section 4 below. 
 
Comparing the valuations in more detail, and giving just a single reference to open the 
door to a wider literature, a few observations can be made:  
 
- All countries differentiate the value of travel time savings by trip purpose. Most 
countries also differentiate by mode, except England and the Netherlands, but the 
Netherlands is apparently about to change this. Sweden also differentiates by trip 
length (longer or shorter than 100 km). Germany stands out by taking a different ǲǳǡ ? ? ?
savings below 5 minutes. All countries seem to use multipliers for waiting and 
walking, although the table reports only some of these. Hensher (2011) provides a 
useful review. 
- Safety values and the relativities between fatal, serious and slight casualties are 
generally similar, although the USA has much higher values across the board and 
Sweden has much higher relative values for serious casualties. The US approach 
uses a hedonic model of wage compensation for risk applied to occupational 
mortality data, while the European methodology is based on stated willingness to 
pay to reduce risk plus a comparatively small addition for lost output. The value of 
statistical life has an importance beyond valuing traffic safety, being the basic value 
for deriving   the health related benefits of increases in cycling and walking For a 
discussion, see Andersson and Treich (2011) 
- Most countries use the standard deviation of travel time to measure road travel 
time variability, and then define the value of the standard deviation relative to the 
value of travel time (the so-called reliability ratio Ȃ ǲǳ     
appendix). For scheduled traffic, most countries instead measure variability by the 
average delay relative to schedule, and then define the value of average delay 
relative to the value of travel time. Sweden also uses a lateness multiplier for long, 
unexpected delays in road traffic. All countries note the challenge of modelling the 
impact of projects.  
- Most countries have multipliers to in-vehicle time for crowding relief on public 
transport. Some distinguish only between travelling seated or standing, while some 
use more elaborate crowding measures. Sweden and New Zealand also have mark-
ups on in-vehicle time for driving in congested conditions.  
- Several countries have introduced fitness and health benefits when appraising 
walking and cycling schemes. The practices in England and Sweden are based on 
the World H ǯ   to estimate the relationship between 
physical activity and life expectancy. Australia and New Zealand have extensive 
guidance relating to walking and cycling. There is an unresolved discussion about 
the extent to which fitnesǯǡ
are already internalised in travel demand and valuations, causing risk for double-
counting.  
- Most countries base their valuations of carbon emissions on a shadow price of 
some carbon emission target, and apply it to all transport energy use. Sweden has 
recently gone from a shadow price approach to basing the valuation on the CO2 tax 
on motor fuel, and assume that this tax will increase proportionally to future GDP 
growth. England uses the forecast European Trading System prices for emissions 
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from the traded sector, and marginal abatement costs for the non-traded sector. 
The latter are currently substantially higher, with the two sectors assumed to align 
by 2030. The values used in England, Germany and Netherlands for the non-traded ǡǯǯǯǤ 
- Arguably the most disparate topic is how wider economic impacts (WEI) are 
treated. Work on WEI:s have been along two lines. The first identifies that the 
presence of tax wedges and agglomeration effects means that increases in 
accessibility will cause benefits external to the traveller, and hence not captured in 
the consumer surplus. The UK has been a forerunner in developing methods for 
quantifying these effects, and these methods are also used in Australia and New 
Zeeland. Sweden has developed a different method but based on a partly similar 
logic. See Mackie, Graham and Laird (2011) for a review. The second line of 
research focuses on inter-industry linkages, often with a special focus on freight 
transport, using regional input/output models or computable general equilibrium 
models. The USA is notable for considering a range of impact pathways beyond 
commuting, such as logistics and supply chain impacts, connectivity to corridors 
and gateways, and intermodal interchanges. Some of these approaches extend well 
beyond the economic welfare framework of cost-benefit analysis and are based on 
regional or local macroeconomic models. 
3.3 Application of CBA across the transport sector 
In all countries, the most important application of CBA is still appraisal of transport 
investments requiring public funds. In particular, it is used for projects where local 
levels ask for national funding. All the countries have transport appraisal manuals 
which are compulsory to use when evaluating projects with national funding. In cases 
where local or regional levels are responsible for funding, it is usually up to the local 
level to decide on evaluation frameworks. For example, some states in the US use CBA 
for state-funded projects, while others use multi-criteria analysis and still others have 
less formalized evaluation frameworks.  
 
Carrying out CBAs is mandatory for road, rail and tram/bus investments in all the 
countries, at least if national funding is asked for. Walking and cycling projects are    ǯ ǡ     rer, probably 
because they seldom require national funding. Germany and the Netherlands also use 
CBA for appraising inland waterways projects. Few countries use CBA extensively for 
sea or air transport projects, although the UK has published as part of WebTAG the 
methodology it uses for government intervention in airport projects. 
 
Maintenance of road and rail infrastructure is a large sector for which cost-
effectiveness and life cycle models for asset renewal are more appropriate than full 
scale appraisal. The issue is usually not whether to close down an asset but how best to 
renew it and with what priority. Questions of upgrading and betterment may be more 
suitable for appraisal (what line speed, what capacity) and Australia makes reference 
to train refurbishment cases in this context. 
 
Appraisal of changes to rail franchise specifications has been common in England, and 
recently appraisal guidance has been applied to national revenue support programmes 
for bus service provision. Sweden has made attempts at allocating scarce railway 
capacity among competing operators using CBA, but so far with limited success. There 
are also attempts at using CBA to evaluate pricing schemes; for example, it has been 
used in Sweden to evaluate the Stockholm congestion charging and a suggested 
national distance-based charge for trucks.  
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Finally, the role of appraisal in the public consultation and public inquiry processes 
should not be overlooked. Appraisal provides the framework, and much of the content 
around which planning issues such as route location, land take, mitigation and 
compensation are determined. The appraisal regime underpins a great deal of work on 
design choices and option development. This appears to be similar in most countries 
even if the precise arrangements differ. 
4 APPRAISAL CHALLENGES 
We have argued in section 3 that the practice of CBA for transport projects has made 
significant progress in recent years. Yet there is also a sense that the requirements on 
the analyst are becoming ever more demanding.  Infrastructure projects have become 
more controversial over time, the appraisal needs to be both robust and exhaustive 
(the Environmental Impact Statement for the HS2 railway line in England is reputed to 
run to 55,000 pages), and legal challenges through Judicial Review have become more 
common. At the same time the consensus surrounding CBA as a suitable welfare 
economics paradigm has come under threat. Particularly since the global financial ǡǮǯ
ǯǫ
social consensus, planning timescales for new infrastructure have become extremely 
extended. Fifteen years from programme entry to open on the ground is not unusual of 
which the construction phase may be only the last two years. This is quite a contrast 
with the agility of global competitors. 
 
Of course these issues go far beyond the question of appraisal which is a relatively 
small part of the process, but their existence is the backdrop against which to discuss 
the challenges which transport appraisal faces. We divide these into three types: 
technical, planning and policy. 
4.1 Technical challenges 
Some effects that are in principle included in a CBA are based on relatively unreliable 
methods and data. Below, we present our assessment of the most important areas for 
further methodological development. Our focus is mainly the conventional application 
area of appraising transport investments; methodological development for areas such 
as maintenance, pricing schemes and allocation of railway capacity introduce different 
requirements. 
 
The outcome of a CBA is obviously fraught with many kinds of uncertainties. The future 
scenario assumptions underlying the forecasts are uncertain; the forecast effects of the 
project are uncertain; the final cost of the project is often uncertain; benefit valuations 
are both methodologically and philosophically contestable. There has been some recent 
progress in quantifying the uncertainties due to uncertain valuations, scenario 
assumptions, and cost and benefit estimates (Börjesson, Eliasson, & Lundberg, 2014; 
Börjesson, Jonsson, & Lundberg, 2013; Eliasson & Fosgerau, 2013; Holz-Rau & 
Scheiner, 2011). These studies generally conclude that the CBA ranking of alternative 
investments is in fact fairly robust to such uncertainties.  
 Business travel time savings 
In a typical road or rail capital project, business travel time savings may account for 
10% of traffic but 30% or more of user benefits. The valuation of these savings is hence 
hugely important for the outcome of a CBA. Despite this, comparatively little research 
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    Ǥ        ǲ ǳ
approach, where the value of a travel time saving is equal to wage plus non-wage 
employment costs. But there are challenges to this assumption. The time use literature 
notes that people can work while travelling, so all travel time is not unproductive, and 
that parts of a travel time saving might be converted into leisure rather than work. 
These observations are formalised in the so-called Hensher approach (Hensher, 1977), 
which is used in some countries to at least some extent.  These estimates generally give 
lower valuations than the cost savings method.  
 
However, this approach is at odds with most empirical willingness-to-pay estimates, 
which usually yield considerably higher valuations. There may be several reasons for 
this, including difficulties of getting reliable data on travel costs, and the likelihood that  ǯ          ǯ  Ǥ           
savings should in fact exceed mere cost savings, starting from the observation that the 
benefit of spending time at the destination must exceed the benefit of spending time at 
the office, or otherwise the trip would not have been made (Karlström & Eliasson, 
2007).  
 Commercial traffic 
Commercial traffic such as freight and distribution transport may make up 10-20% of 
traffic, and account for a higher proportion of the benefits. Despite this, data on this 
traffic is generally scarce, and the valuation of its time savings generally shaky. A 
particular problem is that travel time savings on a single link may have repercussions 
for entire logistics chains, making such savings difficult to model and value. Moreover, 
freight and distribution traffic is much more heterogeneous than person traffic is in 
terms of values of time, reliability and scheduling constraints. 
 Congestion and crowding 
It is well known that static network models cannot handle severe congestion well for a 
number of reasons, mainly because such models do not handle adequately  the  
propagation of queues and the resulting  congestion at the upstream intersections and 
junctions. An analysis by Engelson and van Amelsfort (2011) shows that this problem is 
not remedied by adjusting the volume-delay functions since the model still does not 
account for spillback queues. Hence, projects aiming at reducing road congestion may 
tend to be undervalued, and the costs of increased traffic congestion due to induced 
traffic may be underestimated. The long-term benefits of increased road capacity may 
be either over- or underestimated because of this.  
 
Public transport crowding is a major problem in many large cities, and has received 
increasing policy attention. There has been significant recent progress on valuing 
crowding, but studies that model the consequences for reliability, travel times and 
potentially denied boarding are still relatively rare. 
 Supply/demand interaction problems 
Appraising publicly funded railway investments brings with it the particular problem 
that the benefits depend on how the investment will be used. For road investments, this 
is virtually exogenous from the point of view of the decision maker and the forecaster:           ǯ Ǥ   
railway investments, the public usually has considerable influence on what trains will 
use the railway. In some countries, the government may be controlling the use; in 
others, the government establishes a regulator with responsibility for allocating 
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capacity.  In many cases, railways are used by a mixture of private operators (e.g. 
freight operators), publicly owned companies (e.g. national railway operators) and 
publicly funded and subsidized traffic (e.g. regional commuter trains). Hence, decisions 
about the future usage of the investment are integrated with the investment decision, 
and appraisal is impossible without explicit assumptions about this future usage. 
Despite this, few appraisal guidelines regulate this, leaving it to the analyst to decide 
what to assume about future usage and supply Ȃ frequencies, stopping patterns, 
allocation between different kinds of trains etc. This is somewhat similar to the 
appraisal of airport capacity decisions where predictions have to be made about how a 
regulated airport sector will behave and how private sector airlines will respond to 
changes in airport capacity and tariffs and to each other. 
4.2 Planning 
One of the main challenges for CBA is how it should be integrated in planning and 
decision processes. A CBA needs a fairly detailed description of the proposed project, 
and it is often the case that such detailed descriptions are available only late in a 
decision process. The tre  ǲ- ǳ   
challenge even more severe. The idea of problem-oriented planning is to first identify ǲǳǡǤ
processes often end up in identifying a certain investment as the only solution to the 
identified problem, concluding that even if the cost of the investment regrettably 
exceeds the benefits, it should be carried out anyway, since the problem is so severe. 
The catch lies in the definition of what exactly constitutes a problem. In some cases, this 
might be relatively uncontroversial: severe problems with air quality or road safety, for Ǥ   ǡ   ǲǳ    ǣ ǡ ǲinadequateǳ     ǡ  ǡ 
etc. Here, the definition of ǲinadequateǳ only serves as a motivation of a certain 
investment further on in the planning process. Such processes often accumulate 
enough backing from politicians and planners that the resulting investment proposals 
become very difficult to reject. As a result, projects may be selected on the grounds that ǲǳǡ
actually is a cost-efficient solution.  
 
Another problem for CBA is that the policy agenda has moved on from merely reducing  Ǥ  ǲ ?ǳ Ȃ reliability, regeneration and resilience Ȃ are nowadays 
common goals for transport projects, and they are often difficult to quantify and hence 
to include in formal appraisal. Likewise, many projects have a local/regional economic 
development motive rather than a pure transport sector one. The common failure for 
CBA to find a role in planning processes may be a deeper difference in culture. Very 
generally, economists and engineers tend to think in comparative statics, while 
planners tend to think in dynamics. This may explains some of the mutual frustration 
often encountered in planning processes.  
 
A third challenge for CBA is that it does not directly capture the fact that investments 
often belong in a particular planning context. Often, they are framed in a strategy to 
develop a city or a region in a specific way, for example, regarding the built 
environment. This planning context is not directly reflected in the CBA, although CBA ǲǳȂ say, to 
increase the accessibility of a specific part of a region to make it more attractive for 
development. This may partly explain the low impact of CBA on decisions: it may be 
that some highly profitable investments are not addressing needs that are prioritized in 
the overall strategic planning of a region. 
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4.3 Appraisal, Economic Impact and the Overall Business Case 
A further challenge comes from those who believe that cost benefit analysis gives the 
decision maker the wrong answer. Several past government ministers have voiced 
scepticism about willingness to pay based benefits and their inability tǲǳa tangible effect on the real economy. The pursuit of an alternative metric to 
the BCR becomes more widespread when decision making is devolved to local or 
regional decision makers who are responsible for allocating part of a national budget to 
local schemes.  The challenge takes the shape of deciding how to present evidence on 
how a scheme might perform against these other objectives using a range of methods, 
while ensuring some level of consistency between them. 
 ƐĐŚĞŵĞ ?ƐĐontribution to economic growth   
Despite evidence of the contribution of transport investment to economic growth at the 
macroeconomic level, analysts face a challenge when asked by a government minister 
to quantify the impact of a scheme on the economy. While such a question might seem 
out of place, given the relationship between the cost of any individual transport scheme 
and the overall GDP of a country, it is not an unreasonable one if posed by a transport 
minister seeking to justify a transport budget to a hard-pressed ministry of finance. 
 
One of the strengths of social CBA is that it tries to capture all kinds of welfare effects Ȃ 
increases in leisure time as well as working hours, increases in accessibility to housing 
as well as accessibility to workplaces. But this is sometimes seen as a weakness; after 
all, the social benefits in a CBA are sometimes seen as lightweight fairy-gold. This 
criticism of CBA gets more weight by the fact that parts of the economic effects fall 
outside traditional CBA, for example at least some of the effects on productivity and tax 
revenues (although some countries have made efforts to bring these effects into 
standard CBA guidelines, notably the UK). The global financial crisis may have made 
politicians even more interested in real economic impact, and not the less tangible CBA 
social benefits. They want an account of how primary impacts flow through into the 
real economy.  
 
This means that CBA now competes with evaluation frameworks which purport to 
measure the real economic effects, such as Gross Value Added methods.  CBA and GVA 
can produce very different results for the same project, since there are several 
differences in scope and perspective. CBA tries to capture quality of life benefits, not 
just economic benefits, and tends to value benefits using population averages, for 
equity reasons, rather than the unprocessed willingness-to-pay measures (captured by 
prices) at the base of GVA methods.  
 
A 200 ?   ǯǡ       
ǯ
published by the UK DfT provides an indicator of the GDP impact of a scheme. The 
indicator is the sum of the present values of what might be described as the real 
economy components of the cost benefit appraisal.  It is made up of business and 
commercial vehicle time and operating costs savings, agglomeration benefits and the 
effect of any labour supply effects on gross value added (in place of the much smaller 
tax wedge that forms the labour supply benefit in the cost benefit appraisal). The  ǡ
 ?ǯǡ
form an alternative ranking to one which relies on a welfare based assessment of value 
for money.  But the reputation of the minister of finance (or of Chancellor of the 
Exchequer in the case of the UK) hangs on delivering higher rates of economic growth 
than the pundits have forecast this year, next year and perhaps the year after. A metric 
based on the present   
   ?ǯ      a 
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finance minister to know whether, by favouring transport over health or social security 
in the decisions about public spending,  the government will outsmart the pundits and ǯutation will be saved. 
 Local and regional impacts  
Countries with federal governments generally devolve decision making on transport 
schemes to the state or regional level. In many cases the state or regional government 
has established its own appraisal guidance, which differs from the national in certain 
respects, such as the values put on some of the impacts of the scheme. The 
inconsistencies that arise from having certain differences in appraisal methods may 
complicate comparisons between options across the country, but this does not 
constitute a major challenge. 
 
Cost benefit analysis takes a national perspective. Indeed, it is rarely feasible to provide 
any identification of the beneficiaries of a scheme beyond some crude approach  based 
on the origins or destinations of the trips in the transport model. This presents a 
potential challenge for local politicians, who are elected to do their best for the locality 
and whose objectives differ from the national well-being that it is the duty of the 
central government to promote.  
 
In many cases local politicians see their role as boosting employment and productivity 
in their area, a more tangible outcome of a transport scheme than transport user time 
savings.  And it matters little to a local decision-maker whether the jobs attracted by a 
transport investment are additional jobs or are displaced from elsewhere within the 
country.   
 
There are several approaches to estimating the impact of a transport scheme on the 
spatial distribution of economic activity in an urban area or larger region, including 
Spatial Computable General Equilibrium models, transport/land use interaction models 
complemented by data on economic activity, wage equation models and other models 
of urban agglomeration. All of these have their limitations. Much of the recent work has 
focused on agglomeration economies and hence provides no guidance on the impact of 
interurban schemes on productivity and employment. Yet there is a demand for models  ǯ   employment and output to meet the requirements of local 
policy makers who want to know what a scheme will deliver for the local economy.  
 
The challenge to CBA comes in the existence of dual objectives. The local politicians 
might decide to prioritise on the basis of gross value added in their region, irrespective 
of whether the jobs attracted are those that another region competing for funding had 
counted as part of its base case. Central government needs some assurance that the 
projects chosen by local politicians for their share of a nationally raised budget 
represent acceptable value for money.  
 Does a synthesis exist? 
The challenge that comes because of the dual objectives, a welfare-based one and a GVA 
based objective, is not insuperable. In the case of local transport schemes which are 
funded by central government, ministers might require all projects to meet some 
minimum cost benefit threshold, above which the ranking of options is for the local 
politicians to determine. The bigger challenge lies in the adequacy of the local 
transport/land use models or methods based on wage equations and agglomeration 
economies to predict to an acceptable level of accuracy the increase in productivity and 
jobs. And since the GVA models focus on the transport cost changes as the main 
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measure of changes in the attractiveness of the city as a place to live and work and for 
employers to locate in, all of the other quality of life effects of a scheme now carefully 
incorporated in the cost benefit analysis are ignored.  
 
The approach used in local schemes to estimate the employment and GVA effects is less 
satisfactory when applied at a national level because many of the benefits to one 
location are the jobs that are displaced from others. Recent developments in LUTI and 
urban agglomeration modelling have made progress in estimating the extent of this 
displacement of economic activity; however, this remains work in progress and is very 
different from the tried and tested methods of cost benefit appraisal. So a synthesis of Ǯǯ
from the national perspective because of shortcomings in any model of the impacts of a 
project on national GVA.     
5 CONCLUSIONS 
Cost-benefit analysis has become a widely used and well developed tool for appraisal of 
proposed transport projects. An important advantage of using CBA is that it is a way to 
overcome cognitive, structural and process-related limitations and biases in decision 
making.  
 
Our brief survey of a number of countries where CBA plays a formalised role in decision 
making shows a broad similarity in methods and valuations, based on substantial 
amounts of research. All countries place the CBA results in a comprehensive 
assessment framework that also includes various types of non-monetised benefits. 
Some parts of the appraisal methodology are undergoing rapid development; wider 
economic impacts and the valuation of reliability in particular come to mind. Still, there 
are areas sorely in need of methodological development, where less seems to have 
happened in the last decade. Considering their importance for appraising transport 
investments, time saving and reliability benefits for business travel and freight 
transport and the treatment of congestion and crowding relief stand out as particularly 
important to develop. Some of the biggest technical challenges are as much for 
modelling as for appraisal.  
 
Some of the other main challenges to CBA and to quantitative assessment in general lie 
in the institutional and political context. Appraisal works best where society and its 
representatives have an open mind about the importance or social value for money of 
any project. Then, provided the analysis is timely, CBA has an important role to play in 
the decision process. When planning processes are centred around a politically 
predefined ǲǳ  ǲǳ, dispassionate analysis becomes much more difficult. 
This is particularly the case with mega-projects where the project may be funded out of 
a special budget and its opportunity cost in terms of projects foregone may be unclear. 
The solutions to such process issues lie in the institutional rather than analytical 
domain. 
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8 APPENDIX: A CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON OF APPRAISAL PRACTICE 
Table 1. General Appraisal Framework Rules 
 England Germany Netherlands Sweden USA NSW Australia New Zealand 
Appraisal Period 
 
Default 60 year 
operating life 
Component specific 
service lives and 
annuity factors 
Varies, e.g. 100 
years or infinite 
Varies 40-60 years 
depending on type of 
investment 
Varies depending on 
project life cycle, 
typically 25 Ȃ 30 years Varies Ȃ 30 years life for roads, 50 for rail tracks & tunnels, 35 for rail rolling 
stock, 15 for buses. Most 
rail evaluations 30 years.    
Max 30 years for road projects, 
from the year in which 
significant benefit or cost 
commences.  
Discount Rate 
 
3.5% for first 30 
years  then 3% 
3% 2.5% (plus 3% risk 
premium) 
3.5% (changed from 4% 
recently) 
Federal: 7%  with 
sensitivity for 3%; 
States: vary 3-7% 
7 %, with sensitivity tests 
of 4% and 10%.   
8% (changed from 10% in 2008)  
Unit of Account 
 
Market Prices  Factor prices 1998 
basis (updated to in 
review 2009/2010) 
Was factor cost, but 
now market prices  
Market prices Market price  Factor cost  
 
Factor costs  
Shadow price of 
Public Funds 
No shadow price No shadow price No shadow price 1.3  No shadow price No shadow price  No shadow pricing. 
Key appraisal 
metrics 
 
NPV ; BCR BCR; MCA scores for 
ERA and SIA 
NPV ; BCR ; IRR Net benefits/investment 
cost.  
Primarily NPV, BCR; 
GDP and jobs 
sometimes  
 
NPV, BCR, NPVI, FYRR BCR(n), denominator is national 
econ costs. Also BCR(g), 
denominator is govt costs. FYRR 
to indicate optimum start date. 
Treatment of 
non-monetised 
items in overall 
assessment 
May adjust value-
for-money category 
Included, procedure 
to red-flag for special 
planning mandate 
Presented in a 
standard format 
table 
Presented in a standard 
format table. Considered 
in overall value-for-
money rating 
Qualitative assessment 
(most State DOTs use 
multi criteria analysis) 
Can be included in a 
hybrid BCR calculation 
Presented in a standard format 
table.  
Risk and 
Uncertainty 
 
QRA; Optimism Bias Initially not included; 
sensitivity tests for 
demand and modal 
shift risks in review 
3% risk premium in 
discount factor 
Not explicitly; maybe 
implicitly captured by 
discount factor, but does 
not vary between types of 
investments. 
Uncertainty must be 
identified; risk analysis 
done where warranted 
Contingency for risk 
added to base cost 
estimate- allowance for a 
specified level of risk in 
project implementation  
Detailed risk analysis procedures 
described. No specific 
adjustment of costs or benefits 
for optimism bias, but guidance 
on cost contingencies at various 
stages in planning process. 
Form of 
documentation 
 
Green Book ; NATA ; 
WebTAG . 
Report OEI guidelines, SEE 
website 
National guidelines in the ǲ ǳǡ 
every ~3 years 
Federal guidelines for 
each mode; states have 
own guidelines Ȃon web 
& published docs  
Guidelines Ȃmemo 
circular to transport 
agencies, publish on 
intranet 
Economic Evaluation manual 
(EEM), maintained by NZ 
Transport Agency.  
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Table 2. Valuation of impacts (as of spring 2013; new values for time and reliability for Netherlands presented later in 2013) 
 England Germany Netherlands Sweden USA NSW Australia New Zealand 
T
ra
ve
l T
im
e 
Sa
vi
n
gs
: 
 
EB  
 
£34.12/hr average 
of working 
persons 
 ? ? ?Ǥ ? ? Ȁ ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡ ? ? ?Ǥ ? ? Ȁ ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ
mode-/vehicle specific 
33- ? ? ?Ȁ  247 SEK/h for trains, 
291 SEK/h other modes 
$23/h car, bus & 
train; $57 air & high 
speed rail 
A$44/hr 2012 (128% of av 
weekly earnings/38 week-hrs)  
Driver-car 32.67, LCV 32.13, 
MHCV 27.54. Pass-car, LCV, PT, 
cycle, pedn 29.73. 
 
Commutin
g 
 
£6.46/hr 
 9-10  ?Ȁ Trips shorter/longer 
than 100 km (SEK/h): 
Car 87/108; Bus 53/39; 
Train 69/73; Air 108 
$12 local commute, 
$17 intercity 
commute  
Road A$13.76/hr, rail NSW  
$14/hr (40% of AWE/38week-
hrs) 
Driver-car, CV 10.69; Pass-car, CV 
8.01; PT seated 6.44; PT standing, 
cycle, pedn 9.04.  
 
Other 
 
£5.71/hr 
Walk 2x IVT 
Wait 2.5x IVT 
6.3  ?/hr (2008); time 
savings below 5 min are 
reduced using a 
declining function  
6-7  ?Ȁ Car 59/108; Bus 33/39; 
Train 53/73; Air 108 
$24 Walk & wait;  
Personal time:  
$12 for local vehicle 
travel, $23 for 
intercity travel, $32 
for air & HSR travel 
A$13.76/hr recommended by 
TfNSW. Rail uses $7-9/hr  for 
educ/other trips but peak/off-
peak values mostly used.  TfNSW 
recommends Walk 1.15-1.5*IVT  
Driver-car, CV 9.45; Pass-car, CV 
7.12; PT seated 4.18; PT standing, 
cycle, pedn 5.82. [EEM1, A4.2]   
 
Goods and 
Bus 
Drivers 
 
£13.00/hr 
   $24 bus drivers,  
$25 truck drivers, 
$40 rail transit,  
$76 airline pilots  
Freight/vehicle hr, i.e. 
A$20.29 articulated 6 axle 
A$29.37 B-Double 
A$57.84 Triple road train 
 
Reliability (RR: 
stddev-value 
relative to IVT. 
Lateness 
multiplier 
(LM): value of 
average delay 
relative to IVT) 
RR 0.8-1.4;LM 3 - 
 
25% surcharge on 
time benefits 
Car: RR 9, LM 3.5. 
Train, PT: LM 3.5 
RR 0.8 Ȃ 1.1 
based on  the 80th Ȃ 
50th percentile  
RR 1.0. Rail LM 3.7  RR approach is used. 
Comfort and 
crowding 
multipliers 
relative to IVT 
Rail: 1.03-1.16 
sitting in crowded 
conditions; 
standing 1.65 
(short distance), 
2.11 (long 
distance)  
-  surcharges Driving in congestion 
1.5.  
PT crowding: 1.0-3.0.  
No Crowding multipliers used for 
rail (relating to reduction in total 
IVT associated with the amenity 
improvement), pedestrian 
environment review system 
(PERS), 
RailCorp has used a passenger 
rating approach to value station 
and train refurbishments. 
Driving in congestion: VoT (not 
multiplier) up to  
4.32 (driver), 3.22 (pass) for EB; 
up to 3.77 (driver), 2.81 (pass) 
other purposes. 
PT crowding: 1.4 for standing 
Safety 
 
Fatal £1.65m 
Serious £0.186m 
Slight £ 0.014m 
accident costs 
differentiated by road 
types for accidents with 
material damages and 
Fatal 2.7 ? ? ?  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? 
Light 0.005- ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? 
Damage 0.004   ? 
Fatal 23.7 MSEK 
Serious 4.4 MSEK 
Slight 0.2 MSEK 
 
Fatal $9.1 million 
Serious $0.955m 
Moderate $0.427m 
Minor $0.027m  
Fatal A$6.3m  
Serious $466,614  
Fatal 3.798 $M 
Serious injury 0.401 $M 
Slight 0.021 $M. Costs per injury 
accident ($M)Ȅ50km/h speed 
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accidents with personal 
injury; 
 Damage $3285 per 
crash 
limit: fatal 4.020, serious 0.432, 
slight 0.025, PDO 0.002; 
100km/hr fatal 4.560, serious 
0.486, slight 0.029, PDO 0.003 
Wider 
economic 
impacts 
Agglomeration 
Output change 
(Imp Comp) 
Labour mkt effect 
Special bonuses for 
cross-border transport 
and connections with 
airports/seaports; 
 
From RAEM or REMI 
model. Or: 1% more 
agglomeration gives 
0.023% higher wages 
Estimated relationship 
accessibility=>wage 
exists. Result quoted as ǲ ǳ
outside standard CBA. 
Using TREDIS or 
REMI model; covers 
labour market and 
truck delivery mkt  
Only included to date in large 
projects (adding  around 10-20% 
to project benefits). E&Y Toll road 
analysis estimated lower national 
than NSW WEB benefits. 
Agglomeration economiesȄapply 
only to large/complex urban tpt 
projects in major centres. 
Procedures use tpt model data 
and set of agglom elasticities to 
estimate changes in effective 
densities and hence productivity 
gains 
Regeneration 
 
Employment 
effects in RAs 
Employment benefits 
regionally differentiated  
Not included No Used in multi-
criteria analysis 
Population & employment gains 
on corridor from Transit 
Orientated Development 
included in larger PT schemes. 
Not included. 
Noise 
 
Annoyance Value 
£10.91 per dB 
change per 
household per 
annum at 45dBA 
to £127 at 80dBA 
WTP for annoyance  ? ? ?Ǥ ? ?  
resident equivalent at 
night (down to 37 
dB(A)). Outside built-up 
areas (59 dB(A) 
sensitive sites, 64 dB(A) 
open space) 
29.97 per dB per 
person 
Table of values for 
different dB values, in 
SEK/person. Different 
for train and road noise, 
and for 
indoors/outdoors 
exposure.  
based on cost of 
sound barrier or 
land value impact,  
 
Change in property values 0.9% 
per dB change in noise level. No 
effect below 50 dB(A) L10(18h). 
Rail projects have included per 
km figures. 
Cost of road traffic noise = $410pa ȗȗ ?ǯ
[EEM1, A8.2] 
Local Pollution 
 
PM10, NOx. 
Marginal 
abatement costs 
where EU limits 
for  NOx exceeded. 

   ? ? ? ?Ȁt 
NOxe. Local air quality:  ? ?Ǥ ? ?Ȁ  
equivalent. 
Carcinogenic: 1.24 M ? 
per death. (2008)  
PM10, SOx, NOx: 
combination of  
methods 
Costs for PM2.5, VOC, 
SO2, NOx.SEK/exposed 
person. Varies with ǲ ǳ
(topography etc.). 
PM10, NOx, SOx. 
VOC,  
0.001 * change in PM10 
concentration * 
population exposed * normal 
death rate * value of life  
0.001 * change in PM10 
concentration * exposed 
population * normal death rate * 
value of life. 
Climate Change 
 
Non traded 
£/tonne CO2e 
2010 £ 53.58 
2050 £207.28 
 ? ? ? ?Ȁ ?ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ? ? Ȁ  ? ȋȌǡ ? ? ? ǡ  ? ? ? ? 
(2008) for review 
  
62.66 per tonne CO2 1 SEK/kg short run 
(short term policy, 
timetables etc.)  
1.5 SEK/kg long run 
(investments) 
$19 - $21 per ton 
CO2  
Australia has introduced a 
carbon tax which has raised 
electricity charges and also 
reduced rail fuel duty rebate 
(increased rates by around 1%). 
Road freight exempt to mid-
2014.  
CO2 $40/tonne CO2 , or 4% of VoC 
changes.  
Environmental 
Capital 
(Landscape, 
Biodiversity, 
Heritage) 
Qualitative 
assessment 
Qualitative and MCA 
scores from ERA and 
HDA 
Qualitative  Qualitative assessment Qualitative 
assessment, 
represented in multi 
criteria analysis  
 
 
Largely descriptive/qualitative  
Other  Qualitative and MCA   -- Water Pollution   Ǯ 
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NOTE  At the time of reporting, £1 = 1.15 EUR = 9.75 SEK = 1.50 USD= 1.45 AUD= 1.80 NZD 
  
significant--
please specify 
 
score from spatial 
impact assessment; 
Recognition of project 
interdependencies;  
Mark-up for induced 
traffic 
Noxious fumes Urban separation 
Upstream & Downstream costs 
ǯȄincludes Security of 
access (in the light of potential 
earthquakes, land slips etc) and 
Investment option values 
(flexibility to future uncertain 
demands etc)  
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Table 3. Research sources and dates 
 England Germany Netherlands Sweden USA NSW Australia New Zealand 
T
ra
ve
l T
im
e 
Sa
vi
n
gs
: 
 
Employers 
Business  
WebTAG 3.5.6 On-going projects for 
time costs in passenger 
and freight transport 
for BVWP 2015. 
HCG (1998) Eliasson & 
Karlström (2010) 
2011 USDOT Revised 
Guidance on Valuation of 
Travel Time 
TfNSW Principles and 
Guidelines for Economic 
Appraisal of Transport 
Investment & Initiatives 
  
Beca Carter Hollings & Ferner Ltd,  
Steer Davies Gleave, Forsyte 
Research, Brown Copeland & Co., 
(2002), Review of Benefit 
Parameter Values for Economic 
Evaluation 
 
Commutin
g 
1994 AHCG National 
Value of Time Study 
plus 
HCG (1998) Börjesson & 
Eliasson (2012) 
Same as above Values based on 1997  
Austroads harmonised travel 
time valuation review study.  
For rail, estimates based on 
Douglas Economics 2010/11 
Survey  
Beca Carter Hollings & Ferner Ltd,  
Steer Davies Gleave, Forsyte 
Research, Brown Copeland & Co., 
(2002), Review of Benefit 
Parameter Values for Economic 
Evaluation 
 
Other 
2003 ITS Value of travel 
Time Savings in UK 
HCG (1998) Börjesson & 
Eliasson (2012) 
Same as above Douglas Economics/ RailCorp 
Survey 2010/11  
Beca Carter Hollings & Ferner Ltd,  
Steer Davies Gleave, Forsyte 
Research, Brown Copeland & Co., 
(2002), Review of Benefit 
Parameter Values for Economic 
Evaluation 
Reliability 
Effects 
 
WebTAG 3.5.7 
Range of sources for 
Netherlands MOT Ǯ   
Transport (2005) 
n.a.; Recent research 
project by significance 
et al. (2012) for BVWP 
2015. 
Besseling et al. 
(2004) 
Stddev: Eliasson 
(2004), Train 
delays: Börjesson & 
Eliasson (2011) 
2012 Report, SHRP L03  TfnSW Principles and 
Guidelines 
DEL/RailCorp  
ATC Guidelines 
Congestion and reliability, roads: 
Beca Carter Hollings Ferner Ltd 
and Sinclair Knight Merz (2002). 
PT reliability: M Vincent (2008). 
LTNZ Research Report 339 
Comfort/ 
Crowding 
 
PDFH informed by MVA 
(2010) and Wardman 
(2012). 
- CPB and KIM 
(2009) 
Crowding: 
Wardman 2012, 
Congested driving: 
Wardman 2012 and 
Eliasson 2004 
none Rail train and station crowding 
SP studies and  rating survey 
by Douglas 
Economics/RailCorp 2004-06, 
TfNSW train load surveys. 
Beca Carter Hollings & Ferner Ltd,  
Steer Davies Gleave, Forsyte 
Research, Brown Copeland & Co., 
(2002), Review of Benefit 
Parameter Values for Economic 
Evaluation 
Safety 
 
WebTAG 3.4.1 
Based on Hopkin and 
Simpson TRL RR163, 
1995 updated for 
parameters+value 
BAST (2000);  SWOV (2009) Hultkrantz & 
Svensson 2007 
2013 USDOT Guidance on 
Treatment of the 
Economic Value of a 
Statistical Life 
TfNSW Principles & Guidelines, 
Willingness to Pay Study 
(Hensher & PWC) 
See EEM1  A6.11.  Also for unit 
crash costs (MoT 
2012):http://www.transport.govt.
nz/ourwork/Land/landsafety/Pag
es/TheSocialCostofRoadCrashesan
dInjuries.aspx 
Wider 
economic 
impacts 
 
WebTAG 3.5.14 
Based on DfT (2005) 
informed by Graham et 
al (2005/6/9) 
 Groot et al. (2010) Anderstig et al., 
unpublished. 
Variant published in 
Anderstig et al. 
Description of US practice 
in NCHRP 02-24 Lit 
Review (2013); methods 
in REMI and TREDIS 
WEB model developed by 
TfNSW, Hensher et al (2012) 
referenced in TfNSW Manual 
Graham DJ and Mare DC (2009) 
Agglomeration elasticities in New 
Zealand. NZ Transport Agency 
research report 376 
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2012 documentation 
Regeneration 
 
WebTAG 3.5.8 
Based on DfT (2003) 
Guidance on Preparing 
an Ec. Impact Report 
 -   Variable.  
Benefits included for rail 
projects forecast to regenerate 
brown field sites e.g. Airport 
Rail Link. Denis Johnson & 
Associates, 1994. 
 
Noise 
 
WebTAG 3.3.2 
Values based on 
Bateman et al (2004) 
with benefit transfer by 
Nellthorp et al. 
Weinberger et al. 
(1991) for WTP for 
residential noise 
Jansen (2000) for 
outdoor noise 
INFRAS/IWW 
(2000) 
Train: Swärdh 2012 2011 USDOT Noise 
Analysis and Abatement 
Guidance 
RTA & Austroads Economic 
Analysis Manuals 
See EEM1  A8.2, A8.11 
Local Pollution 
 
WebTAG 3.3.3 
Based on ICGB (AQ) 
DEFRA 2008 
UBA (2007) CE Delft (2001) Derived from 
ARTEMIS  
2012 TIGER Grant Guide; 
2010 NHTSA Regulatory 
Impact  
RTA & Austroads Economic 
Analysis Manuals 
See EEM1 A9.8 
Climate Change 
 
WebTAG3.3.5 
 Shadow price of carbon 
based on Stern (2006) 
and updated in line 
with DECC 2011 
 
UBA (2007) CE Delft (2001) Derived from CO2 
on fuel 
US Govt. Inter-Agency 
Working Group (2010); 
also US EPA, 2010 
RTA & AustRoads Economic 
Analysis Manuals 
See EEM1 A9.6 
Environmental 
Capital ( 
Landscape, 
Biodiversity, 
Heritage) 
WebTAG 3.3.6-9 
Approach unchanged 
since 2006 but recent 
study by Atkins/ 
Metroeconomica 
PÖU (200) Ruijgrok et al. 
(2007) 
 -- RTA & AustRoads Economic 
Analysis Manuals  
See EEM1 A8.11 etc 
Other 
significant--
please specify 
 Induced traffic: STASA 
et al. (2000) 
SIA (Würdemann & 
Sieber, 2004) 
Bogaert et al. 
(2005) 
 -- RTA & AustRoads Economic 
Analysis Manuals 
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Table 4. Applicability of appraisal 
 
 England Germany Netherlands Sweden USA NSW Australia New Zealand 
C
ap
it
al
 p
ro
je
ct
s-
--
 la
rg
e/
sm
al
l 
 
Road   
Mandatory Mandatory  Mandatory Mandatory USDOT Grants: 
Mandatory CBA 
StateDOTs: varies 
Mandatory Mandatory for all projects 
applying for central government 
transport funding allocation from 
the National Land Transport 
Fund. 
 
Rail 
Mandatory ; WebTAG 
values supplemented 
by rail specific values 
from PDFH  
Mandatory (BVWP for 
federal, Standardisierte 
Bewertung for state / 
regional) 
Mandatory Mandatory USDOT Grants: 
Mandatory CBA 
StateDOTs: varies 
Rail Passenger mandatory. 
Rail freight depends on locality. 
ARTC mainly responsible for rail 
freight infrastructure appraisals 
outside metropolitan Sydney. 
Within metropolitan area, 
evaluations have been 
undertaken by agencies of NSW 
government eg Northern Sydney 
Freight Corridor. 
Ǥ Ǯ ǯ 
pax projects Ȃmandatory for 	 Ǥ Ǯ ǯ
projectsȄǮ-ǯ 
programme been funded direct 
from central govt funds over last 
10 years; current segregated 
funding for passenger transport 
(NLTF service only subsidies) 
and freight (now fully 
commercial and no 
subsidisation) with below rail 
track access charge according to 
use.  
 
Bus/Tram 
Mandatory Mandatory for large 
investments  
Mandatory Sometimes; 
mandatory if 
national funding is 
applied for 
USDOT Grants: 
Mandatory CBA 
StateDOTs: varies 
Mandatory Mandatory for infrastructure 
seeking NLTF funding 
contribution. (Most vehicles 
funded by operator through 
operating contracts.) 
 
Air 
WebTAG Unit 3.18 
provided guidance for 
government 
intervention including 
policies, strategy, 
regulation, planning 
applications  
State responsibility; 
general budgetary and 
planning law; no specific 
appraisal guidance 
Mandatory Seldom USDOT Grants: 
Mandatory CBA 
StateDOTs: varies 
Largely Commonwealth 
responsibility. larger airport  
evaluations usually submitted to 
NSW Treasury. 
Completely separate from 
funding of land transport. Airport 
authorities and airlines operate 
on a commercial basis and have 
own evaluation/funding 
procedures.  
 
Sea/Water 
Port capacity through 
planning system. 
Mode shift from road 
appraised (ref to  
Waterborne Freight 
Grant) 
Mandatory for Inland 
Waterways as part of 
BVWP; Seaports are state 
responsibility and fall 
under general budgetary 
and planning law with no 
specific appraisal 
guidance. 
Mandatory Sometimes USDOT Grants: 
Mandatory CBA 
StateDOTs: varies 
Passenger (urban) Ferry covered 
under TfNSW Economic 
Evaluation Manual. 
Port expansion via 
Environmental Impact Statement 
including Economic Impact 
Assessment and road/rail traffic 
analysis. 
Completely separate from 
funding of land transport. Ports 
and shipping lines operate on a 
cxommercial basis, with own 
procedures.  
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US terms: CBA= cost-benefit analysis, MCA=multi-criteria analysis ranking;  EIA=economic impact analysis,  FIA=fiscal impact analysis 
 
 
National 
Mandatory for 
national vfm 
Mandatory (BVWP) Mandatory Mandatory USDOT Grants: is 
Mandatory CBA 
Mandatory for NSW transport 
projects seeking national funding 
(Infrastructure Australia). 
Mandatory evaluation procedures 
(EEM) for all national roads 
State 
n/a Mandatory for large 
public transport 
investments 
(Standardisierte 
Bewertung); non-binding 
guidance for road 
investments (EWS) 
n/a n/a StateDOTs: CBA or 
MCA (varies), 
usually also EIA 
Mandatory for strategic 
alignment and VFM 
n/a 
Local 
Local/Regional GVA 
approaches 
increasingly for Local 
Econ Impact 
Guidance 
(Standardisierte 
Bewertung and EWS) 
Discretionary Seldom Metropolitan 
Planning Orgs: 
MCA or EIA 
Discretionary Mandatory evaluation procedures 
(EEM) for all local rods projects 
seeking central government 
funding.  
R
ev
en
u
e 
E
xp
en
d
it
u
re
s:
 
Maintenance 
Unlikely except 
betterment 
Investments for renewal 
of federal roads included 
in BVWP;  
? Attempts are 
made 
Use lifecycle cost 
models for 
pavement & 
bridges 
Major train refurbishment s 
subject to appraisal, programs 
above business as usual. 
Roads:  other than routine mtce, 
road/bridge renewals etc are 
subject to EEM procedures 
[EEM1, 4.2 etc] 
 
Subsidies Variable; increasing 
use. Yes for 
assessing rail 
franchise bids and 
for mode shift 
revenue support 
According to budgetary 
law (§7) all public 
expenditures have to 
undergo an appropriate 
economic assessment, 
but no specific 
procedures are 
prescribed. 
? Seldom; certain 
pricing measures 
(e.g. kilometre 
charges) 
Yes, CBA and FIA 
for PPP, toll 
projects 
Increasing use for bus fleet 
evaluations and assessment of 
franchise bids. 
PT fares & subsidy levels 
assessed by Independent 
Pricing & Regulatory Tribunal 
of NSW. 
Changes in PT operating 
subsidies associated with 
service changes/new servicer 
are subject to EEM procedures. 
On-going op subsidies for 
current PT services not subject 
to EEM, but scrutinised using 
various VfM indicators.  
A
p
p
ra
is
al
 r
el
ev
an
t 
fo
r:
 
Public 
Consultation 
Yes  Yes Yes Yes Varies among 
states 
As required To a limited extent. 
Planning 
Inquiries/ 
Permission 
YesȄsignificant 
quality control role in 
PI setting 
Yes Yes Yes Varies among 
states 
Yes, CBA for road and rail 
projects often included. 
Economic Impact Assessment 
plus traffic assessment for ports 
and airports).  
To a limited extent. 
